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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
,,<l'(,l\IJNE PROCTOR, on behalf 
of her minor daughter, ANGELA 
flf:fH PROCTOR, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH 
AMERICA and SHIRLEY FLETCHER 
aka SHIRLEY WORTHEN, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Civil No. 19288 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON PRESIDING. 
CASE STATEMENT 
Angela Proctor claims a right to life insurance policy 
proceeds which were paid by Insurance Company of North 
America to Shirley Fletcher Proctor, the "wife" of the 
insured within the meaning of the policies and the intended 
beneticiary. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson of the Third Judicial 
Oio,trict Court heard Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment upon 
stipulated facts, granted Respondents' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and dismissed Appellant's Complaint with prejudice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondent, Life Insurance Company of North America 
("LINA"), respectfully requests that judgment below be 
affirmed and that respondent, LINA, be awarded its costs. In 
the alternative, this case should be remanded to the Trial 
Court for further proceedings. 
FACTS 
On April 24, 1966, Willis Brent Proctor ("Brent") and 
Suzanne Proctor ("Suzanne") were married. (R. 314.) Angela 
Beth Proctor is the sole child of that marriage and is 
Brent's sole surviving issue. (R. 314.) 
Suzanne sued for divorce and obtained an interlocutory 
decree on March 13, 1968 after having separated from Brent. 
(R. 314.) The divorce became final three months after entry 
of the interlocutory decree. (R. 314.) Before the divorce, 
Brent participated in a marriage ceremony with Shirley 
Fletcher Proctor ("Shirley") on July 15, 1967. (R. 315.) 
Subsequent to that marriage ceremony, Shirley and Brent 
resided together as husband and wife continuously until 
Brent's death in a motorcycle accident on September 29, 
1980. (R. 315.) During the thirteen years they lived 
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Brent held Shirley out to be his wife and his only 
1 t, Ile executed several documents indicating that she was 
1,iE; wife. (R. 315, 316.) Among them were loan applications 
indicating Shirley to be his wife. He filed joint Federal 
tax returns with Shirley, sent her "anniversary cards" on the 
anniversary of their marriage and generally represented to 
puhlic, friends and family that Shirley was his sole wife for 
all purposes. 
In April, 1978, Brent purchased an accidental death 
insurance policy from the respondent, LINA, through the 
Chevron Travel Club, Inc. (R. 313.) On the face of the 
Chevron Travel Club application was a printed box, above 
which appeared: "To indicate the level of Broad Coverage 
Accidental Loss-Of-Life Insurance you want included in your 
Chevron Travel Club Membership, affix your stamp here. (See 
reverse for benefits of each Plan.)" (R. 317.) Brent 
attached a paper stamp which indicated that he had selected 
Plan 2, the "Member and Spouse" Plan. (R. 317.) 
The reverse side of the Chevron Travel Club application 
explained the four alternative insurance plans: (1) a "Mem-
ber Only Plan"; (2) a "Member and Spouse Plan"; (3) a "Member 
and Eligible Children Plan"; and (4) a "Member, Spouse and 
Eligible Children Plan". By affixing this particular stamp 
to his application, Brent selected a policy which insured 
hoth his own life and that of his "spouse". 
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This policy of insurance provided that the named insured, 
Brent, could designate a beneficiary. If no beneficiary wer" 
named, the proceeds would be payable to the first surviving 
class of the following beneficiaries: (1) husband or wife, 
(2) child or children, (3) mother or father, or (4) brothers 
or sisters. No specific individual beneficary was named by 
Mr. Proctor in the policy. (R. 313.) 
In January, 1979, Brent and Shirley purchased a second 
LINA policy of insurance through the Chevron Travel Club. 
Again, Brent indicated that he wished to purchase insurance 
under the "Member and Spouse Plan," this time by checking one 
of four possible boxes on the application. (R. 313, 318.) 
No specific individual beneficiary was named in the second 
application and, again, the proceeds of the policy were pay-
able to the first surviving class of the following benefici-
aries: (1) husband or wife, (2) child or children, (3) 
mother or father, or (4) brothers or sisters. (R. 313.) 
As a natural result of injuries sustained in an 
automobile-motorcycle accident, Brent died on September 29, 
1980. (R. 314.) 
The proceeds from the two insurance policies in the sum 
of $46,701.50 were paid to Shirley by LINA as the only claim-
ant under the policies. (R. 314-15.) There is an additional 
$1,900 still to be paid from LINA pending direction of the 
Court. (R. 315.) 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE INSURANCE POLICIES WERE CONTRACTS 
BETWEEN THE INSURED AND THE INSURER AND THE 
LANGUAGE OF SUCH CONTRACTS MUST BE INTER-
PRETED IN LIGHT OF THE INTENT OF THE PAR-
TIES. 
This case hinges on the meaning of the word "wife" as 
used in the two life insurance contracts. The insured, 
Brent, appears to have intended that the term "wife" mean 
oncy Shirley and that she should receive the proceeds of the 
policies. 
The case of Bergera v. Ideal Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 524 
P.2d 599 (Utah 1974), presents an analogous situation. In 
Bergera, the issue was the meaning of the term "war" in a 
life insurance policy which excluded coverage for death 
resulting from war. The insured died while serving in the 
llnited States armed forces in Viet Nam. The President had 
never declared war in Viet Nam and the insured's benefici-
aries claimed coverage. The Court stated: "The policy is 
mPrely a contract between the insured and the insurer. Its 
should be construed pursuant to the same rules as 
are applied to other ordinary contracts, to wit: What did 
thereto intend by the language used?" Id. at 600 
lc-mphasis added). 
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In Bergera, the term "war" was interpretPd according to 
the meaning intended by the insured and the insurer and not. 
according to any meaning expressed by Congress or the Presi-
dent. It is clear that Congress had the power to define the 
term "war". Congress' definition, however, did not control 
what the parties meant by the term "war" in a private con-
tract. 
Similarly, the insurance policies at issue in this case 
must be interpreted according to the meaning intended and 
understood by the insured (Brent) and the insurer (LINA) and 
not according to the intent expressed by the state legisla-
ture. Pacific Automobile Ins. Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins. 
Co. of New York, 161 P.2d 423, 426 (1945) ("an insurance con-
tract like any other contract must be interpreted in the 
light of the intention of the parties"); Cf. Woolery v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 406 F. Supp. 641, 644 (E.D. Va. 
1976) (statutory definition controlled because the policy was 
issued by the federal government under an Act of Congress); 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Spearman, 344 F. Supp. 665 
(M.D. Ala. 1972) (statutory definition controlled because the 
policy was issued by the federal government under an Act of 
Congress). 
As is the case of contracts generally, the car-
dinal principle pertaining to the construction and 
interpretation of insurance contracts is that the 
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intention of the parties should control. 43 Am. Jur. 
2c1 Insurance § 272 (1982) (footnotes omitted). See 
dlso the cases cited therein. 
This Court has always held that "a contract made by par-
ties should be construed so as to give effect to what the 
l''"'tties intended at the time it was made." DuBois v. Nye, 
584 P.2d 823, 824-25 (Utah 1978). See also O'Hara v. Hall, 
628 P. 2d 1289, 1291 (Utah 1981); Barrus v. Wilkinson, 389 
P. 2d 207, 208 (Utah 1965). 
II. 
THE INTENT OF THE INSURED CONTROLS THE 
INTERPRETATION OF THESE PARTICULAR INSUR-
ANCE CONTRACTS, AND BRENT INTENDED THE PRO-
CEEDS TO BE PAID TO SHIRLEY, THE PERSON HE 
CONSIDERED TO BE HIS "WIFE". 
The obvious purpose of LINA in articulating the classes 
of individuals who would receive the benefits of the policies 
was to specify who would be the beneficiaries if the insured 
failed to name specific beneficiaries. Conversely stated, 
LINA's only purpose was to see that the proceeds of the poli-
cies were paid to those persons that the insured intended. 
LINA did not foresee, nor could it have reasonably fore-
seen, that there would be a dispute over the meaning of the 
term "wife" used in the language of the policy. As the Utah 
Supreme Court has stated: 
ln resolving a dispute about the interpretation of 
provisions in a contract the objective is to deter-
mine what the parties intended at the time it was 
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executed; and if the intent with respect to some 
unforeseen subsequent occurrence was not clearly 
articulated, what would have been their intent if 
their minds had adverted to such an occurrence. 
Union Pacific R.R. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 
Utah 2d 255, 408 P.2d 910, 913 (1965). 
It was and is LINA'S intent to pay the policy proceeds to 
the insured's intended, and only, beneficiary. LINA's pur-
pose was only to identify the insured's intended benefici-
ary. Brent's intent, therefore, controls. 
In determining who the beneficiary of a life insurance 
policy is, it is the intention of the insured which is the 
controlling element. Wheaton Nat'l Bank v. Aarvold, 
3 8 Il 1. App. 3d 6 5 8, 3 4 8 N. E. 2d 5 2 0, 5 2 3 ( Il 1. App. 19 7 6) ; 
Pabst v. Hesse, 286 Minn. 33, 173 N.W.2d 925, 927 (1970); 
Jenkins v. Liberty Life Assur. Co., 207 So. 2d 255, 258 (La. 
App. 1968); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Rak, 24 Ill. 2d 128, 
180 N.E.2d 470, 472-73 (1962). 
The intention of the insured is the controlling ele-
ment and almost any form of words which demonstrates 
the insured's intention is sufficient. Thus, the 
fact that the beneficiaries in a life policy are 
misdescribed as respects their relationship to the 
insured generally will not result in the designation 
of no beneficiary so as to disregard the intent of 
the insured. 2 J. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance 
Law and Practice, § 781 (1966 & Supp. 1982) (foot-
notes omitted). 
It is undisputed that Brent intended the LINA proceeds to 
be paid to Shirley. Brent purchased - years after his 
divorce from Suzanne - an insurance plan which insured both 
-8-
1 'i: '·•'If and his "spouse". He obviously considered Shirley to 
and held her out to the public, friends, family 
1nJ the government as his spouse. 
It is clear that Brent considered Shirley to be his 
sp"use for purposes of coverage under the insurance policy 
and that he also considered Shirley to be his "spouse" for 
purposes of payment of the insurance proceeds. Had Shirley 
predeceased Brent, LINA could not possibly have escaped its 
ohligation under the insurance policies to pay death benefits 
to Brent. Shirley's life was insured under the policies as 
the spouse of Brent and LINA was obligated to make payment if 
she had predeceased Brent. Conversely, Brent was an insured 
under the policies and LINA was obligated to make payment of 
the proceeds to Brent's spouse according to the policies. 
It also appears clear that had Brent foreseen any ques-
tion, he could have and would have designated Shirley as a 
specific beneficiary under the policies. See Union Pacific 
R.R. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., supra. 
The Trial Court found that Brent relied upon the clause 
whirh designated who would receive payment in lieu of a named 
beneficiary believing that the proceeds would be paid to 
Shirley. 
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I I I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PARTIES 
INTENDED SHIRLEY TO BE THE BENEFICIARY 
UNDER THE POLICIES IS A FINDING OF FACT 
WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
Appellant's Brief correctly states the proposition that 
the interpretation of a contract is ordinarily a question of 
law for the Court. It is not invariably so, however. "In 
ascertaining the meaning of words in a contract the intention 
of the parties is controlling and where it is susceptible of 
different interpretations extraneous evidence is admissible 
to show the intention." Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, 
Inc., 18 Utah 2d 180, 417 P.2d 761, 764 (1966). 
The appellant does not dispute that extraneous evidence 
is admissible to explain an ambiguous term in a contract and 
appellant correctly points out that a term of a contract is 
not ambiguous merely because the parties to the contract urge 
diverse interpretations upon the Court. Here, however, the 
one party to these insurance contracts whose intent is con-
trolling was not before the Trial Court to testify as to his 
intent. The Trial Court, therefore, heard stipulated facts 
to determine the intent of the parties. 
Once extraneous evidence is properly admitted to deter-
mine the intent of the parties, the intent becomes a question 
of fact. Central Credit Collection Control Corp. v. Graysun, 
-10-
' v<a';h. App. 56, 499 P.2d 57 (1972) [quoted by the Utah 
:;11pr eine Court in Overson v. United States Fidelity & Guar. 
587 P. 2d 149, 151 (Utah 1978)]. 
In the case below, the District Court heard Cross-Motions 
for Summary Judgment on stipulated facts. The Court found 
that Brent had intended the word "wife" to mean only Shirley 
and intended Shirley to receive the proceeds of the insurance 
policies as the beneficiary. The Court's finding was sup-
ported by substantial evidence and must be sustained. Leon 
Glazier & Sons, Inc. v. Larsen, 26 Utah 2d 429, 491 P.2d 226, 
227 (1971). The evidence shows that Brent and Shirley lived 
together as husband and wife for thirteen years. Brent pur-
chased the policies indicating that his "wife" was to be not 
only a beneficiary but an insured also. Brent consistently 
held Shirley out to be his wife for all purposes. There can 
be no doubt that the Trial Court's finding is supported by 
substantial evidence. 
IV. 
APPELLANT'S CONTENTION THAT THE RELATION-
SHIP WHICH BRENT AND SHIRLEY EACH CONSID-
ERED TO BE MATRIMONIAL IN NATURE CANNOT BE 
RECOGNIZED FOR ANY PURPOSE UNDER UTAH LAW 
IS INCORRECT. 
It is clear that a marriage must be validly solemnized by 
an authorized individual in order to be recognized under Utah 
-11-
law for most purposes. However, Utah law does allow invalid 
marriages to be recognized for limited purposes. 
Utah Code Ann • § 3 0 -1 -1 7 • 1 ( 1 9 7 6 ) g i v e s u ta h Co u r ts th, 
power to annul marriages which are prohibited or void. The 
Court also has extensive equitable powers to recognize the 
parties' putative marriage relationship. The Court ma:1 make 
orders for alimony, child support, child custod:1 and child 
visitation rights when annulling an invalid marriage. Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-1-17.2 (1976); Maple v. Maple, 566 P.2d 1229 
(Utah 1977); Ferguson v. Ferguson, 564 P. 2d 1380, 1381-82 
{Utah 1977). See also Jenkins v. Jenkins, 153 P. 2d 262 (Utar: 
1944) (prior to the new statute, attorney's fees could not be 
awarded to a "wife" seeking an annulment because no support 
obligation existed without a valid marriage). By granting a 
Court order for alimony in a proceeding to annul a void mar-
riage, the Court has power to recognize the parties' rela-
tionship and enforce marital obligations even though the mar-
riage was "void" from the beginning. These statutes allow 
Utah Courts to recognize an invalid marriage in equity for 
some limited purposes. 
The case of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Manning, 568 
F.2d 922 (2nd Cir. 1977), is directly on roint. In 
Irene Penn Manning was married to Thomas Gaines in 1941. 
Irene and Thomas Gaines were separated in 1943, but werP n•it 
-12-
J rri•r1. In 1956, Irene participated in a marriage ceremony 
''' I ,Jwi:ird Manning and thereafter lived with Edward as his 
,,,,,, until 1975, when she died. Irene's life was insured 
J,,.J, 1 a Fe·leral Employees Group Life Insurance policy. Irene 
h3rl not designated a specific beneficiary. However, the 
icy indicated that payment would be made according to a 
fP1iPral statutory schedule which gave first priority to the 
iccureJ's "widow" if no beneficiary were named. 
The District Court relied upon Sears v. Austin, 292 F.2d 
6'H' !9th Cir.) cert. denied, 368 U.S. 929 (1961) (overruled 
5 U.S.C.A. § 8105(a) (West Supp. 1983), and held that 
E1ward Manning, and not Thomas Gaines, was entitled to the 
insurance proceeds according to the "manifest intent" of the 
insured. 
Upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court did not question the 
soundness of the "manifest intent" doctrine which had been 
ajopted hy the federal courts in cases involving Federal 
employees Group Life Insurance policies. The "manifest 
intent" doctrine required payment of proceeds to be made 
according to the intent of the insured despite noncompliance 
witb •he technicalities of naming a new beneficiary. Con-
however, had subsequently amended 5 U.S.C.A. § 8705(a) 
IWPst S11pp. 1983) for reasons of administrative convenience 
tn require strict compliance with statutory provisions for 
nam1nq a beneficiary. 
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The Ninth Circuit Court held the District Court's reli-
ance upon earlier cases erroneous, Metropolitan Life Ins. 
v. Manning, 568 F.2d 922, 925-26, but affirmed the award of 
the policy proceeds to Edward Manning upon different 
grounds. It found that Congress, as the insurer and by stat-
ute, intended that payment under the statutory scheme be made 
to the "widow" of the insured as defined by the law of the 
state where the insured was married or resided. The validity 
of Irene's marriage to Edward Manning was controlled by 
Connecticut law. 
Connecticut law, like Utah law, characterized a bigamous 
marriage as "invalid". However, a Connecticut statute 
allowed its state courts to annul marriages which were void 
or invalid. The Connecticut statute, like the Utah statute, 
allowed the Court to make orders for the payment of alimony 
even where an annulment was granted on the grounds that the 
marriage was void. The Ninth Circuit Court, under a statute 
very similar to the Utah statute, recognized the "marriage" 
of Irene and Edward as having "sufficient legal effect to 
entitle him to the proceeds of his wife's insurance even if 
Gaines were able to prove satisfactorily that the marriage 
was bigamous." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Manning, supra, 
at 929. see also Perlstein v. Perlstein, 152 Conn. 152, 204 
A.2d 909, 911-12 (1964). 
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Likewise, the marriage of Brent and Shirley has suffi-
c leqal effect to entitle Shirley to the insurance pro-
as the wife of the insured. Appellant is unable to 
,·ile to any rule of law or public policy which would prevent 
Limited recognition of this marriage relationship in equity 
according to the intent of the insured. See 2 J. Appleman & 
J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 803 (1966 & Supp. 
1982) ("most courts, under ordinary form policies in particu-
lar, are prone to permit a woman living with a man as his 
wife, without the benefit of legal ceremony, or even as regu-
lar mistress, to be designated as a beneficiary and to 
recover the policy proceeds"); 2 J. Appleman & J. Appleman, 
Insurance Law and Practice, § 781 (1966 & Supp. 1982) ("in 
the absence of statutory contractual restriction, the utmost 
freedom exists as to who may be designated as a beneficiary. 
And where the right to so designate is given by contract, 
that right should neither be curtailed nor abrogated. The 
intention of the insured is the controlling element •••• • 
(emphasis added)). 
v. 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED IN ALL RESPECTS. IN THE ALTERNA-
TIVE, THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE 
TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. 
The District Court granted respondents' Motion for Sum-
maty Judgment on the basis of the insured's intent alone. 
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The Court's findings made it unnecessary for the Court to 
consider other issues which were raised by the pleadings. It 
was unnecessary to consider LINA's Cross-Claim against 
respondent, Shirley. It was also unnecessary to consider 
LINA's claims that it is absolved of liability by reason of 
good faith payment to Shirley. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-30 (1974) absolves an insurer who 
makes payment of policy proceeds in good faith to one who 
appears to be entitled to payment before any written con-
flicting notice of claim is received by the insurer. LINA 
made payment to Shirley on December 15, 1980. Appellant 
admits that she first sent written notice of claim to this 
respondent on January 28, 1981. Upon Shirley's representa-
tion that she was the wife of the insured, LINA made payment 
in good faith. 
Many cases have held that good faith payment of life 
insurance proceeds to one who appears to be the beneficiary 
absolves the insurance company of further responsibility if 
payment is made before the insurer receives notice of con-
flicting claims and if the insurer acts reasonably. See Weed 
v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 288 F.2d 463, 464-65 (5th Cir. 
1961): Harper v. Prudential Ins. Co., 662 P.2d 1264, 1273 
(Kan. 1983): Renchie v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 174 
S.W.2d 87 (App. Ct. Tex. 1943): John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. 
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v. Sally, 163 S.W.2d 652 (App. Ct. Tex. 1942); Avondale 
__ Camp W. O. W., 134 Neb. 717, 279 N.W. 355 
11938); Grand Lodge of Colorado K. P. v. Harris, 109 Miss. 
t 13, 68 So. 75 (1915); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
f:() u is vi 11 e Trust Co • , 2 8 Ky • 4 2 6, 8 9 S • W. 2 6 8 ( 19 O 5) • while 
the statutory language is less than clear, any other inter-
pretation renders the statute meaningless. Paying the pro-
ceeds to the correct beneficiary is all the insured is 
required to do under the terms of the insurance contract. 
The statute is not necessary in order to absolve the insurer 
of any liability if correct payment is made. It is presumed 
that the legislature would not pass useless, meaningless or 
futile legislation. Haddenham v. Laramie, 648 P.2d 551, 554 
(Wyo. 1982); Walker v. National Fin. Corp., 102 Idaho 266, 
629 P.2d 662, 664 (1981); State ex rel. Irvin, Inc. v. 
Anderson, 164 Mont. 513, 525 P.2d 564, 570 (1974). 
The resolution of this issue is not important to this 
appeal, however, because the District Court did not address 
this issue. If the Trial Court's decision is not affirmed, 
this case should be remanded for further proceedings. 
Further, respondent, LINA, filed a Cross-Claim against 
Shirley in this case. The District Court's decision made it 
unnecessary to address the issues raised by that Cross-Com-
pla int. If judgment of the Trial Court is not affirmed, this 
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case should be remanded to the Trial Court for further pro-
ceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
The insurance policies which are the subject of this con-
troversy, like any contract, must be interpreted in light of 
the intention of the parties. Here, Brent's obvious intent 
that Shirley receive the insurance proceeds controls. The 
insurance policies contained provisions which designated who 
would receive the proceeds if the insured failed to name 
specific beneficiaries. The District Court found that the 
term "wife" as used in these provisions was intended to 
include the person the insured considered to be his wife and 
that Brent expected and intended that Shirley would receive 
the proceeds of the these life insurance policies. The Dis-
trict Court's finding, upon stipulated facts, is a finding of 
fact which is supported by substantial evidence and, there-
fore, must be sustained. The appellant is unable to point to 
any law or public policy which would prevent this Court 
recognizing the relationship between Brent and Shirley in 
equity for the limited purpose of payment of the insurance 
proceeds according to Brent's intent. The District Court's 
decision should be affirmed in all respects and the respon-
dent, Insurance Company of North America, should be granted 
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11 costs. In the alternative, this case should be remanded 
, proceedings. 
[J/1Tt:D day of October, 1983. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
H. egg 
Attorneys for Responden 
Insurance Company of North 
America 
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